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Jurisdiction
This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a), (5).
Statement of the Issues and Standards of Review
Issue 1: Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's jury
instruction defining intentional conduct for the crime of aggravated assault.
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this court reviews the decision of the court of
appeals for correctness. Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2010 UT 43, % 14, 233 P.3d 489.
Issue 2: Whether Mr. Hutchings' trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective.
Standard of Review: "As to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 'we
review a lower court's purely factual findings for clear error, but review the application
of the law to the facts for correctness.95' Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, U 9, 165 P.3d
1195 (quoting Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, % 13, 156 P.3d 739).
Preservation: State v. Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330, 2009 Utah App. LEXIS
342.

Determinative Provisions
All determinative provisions are at Addendum E.

Statement of the Case
I.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
This case concerns a physical altercation between Larry Hutchings and his

girlfriend, Deborah Cuddeback. During the altercation Ms. Cuddeback's hand was
broken, which provided the basis for the State to file charges against Mr. Hutchings for
aggravated assault. (R. 272:15.) The State also charged Mr. Hutchings with aggravated
burglary and criminal mischief. (R. 272:15.)
The jury was instructed that it could find Mr. Hutchings guilty of aggravated
assault if (i) he intended to assault Ms. Cuddeback and (ii) the assault resulted in serious
bodily injury. (R. 253.) The jury was not instructed that it must find Mr. Hutchings
intended the serious bodily injury. The jury convicted Mr. Hutchings of aggravated
assault and criminal mischief, but not aggravated burglary. (R. 163; 271:219.)
Mr. Hutchings was sentenced to a term of 1 to 15 years. (R. 229.)
In a memorandum decision, the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. State v.
Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330, 2009 Utah App. LEXIS 342. The court of appeals held
that under Utah's aggravated assault statute, "[i]t is enough to satisfy the mens rea
requirement if the defendant intends the act that results in serious bodily injury." Id. ^f 5.
II.

Statement of Facts
When Mr. Hutchings came home on April 6, 2006, Ms. Cuddeback would not

open the door, leading Mr. Hutchings eventually to kick in the door to retrieve his
personal belongings. (R. 271:106, 113-14; 272:102.) A physical altercation followed.
(R. 271:114.) During that altercation, Ms. Cuddeback's hand was broken. (R. 271:12.)
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At trial, Mr. Hutchings did not dispute the physical altercation with
Ms. Cuddeback, but maintained that (i) he was defending himself and (ii) Ms. Cuddeback
had broken her hand while assaulting him. (R. 271:113-14.) Thus, the trial court's
instruction concerning the elements of aggravated assault were critical. The instruction
given by the trial court permitted the jury to convict Mr. Hutchings if it found that it was
his "conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct" that resulted in the injury to
Ms. Cuddeback's hand. (R. 253.) Because Mr. Hutchings did not dispute the alleged
conduct, the only issue was whether during the altercation Mr. Hutchings intended
serious bodily injury, something the jury was instructed that it need not find. (R. 253.)
Both Mr. Hutchings and Ms. Cuddeback's version of events are consistent with
Mr. Hutchings5 contention that he did not intend serious bodily injury. According to
Mr. Hutchings, after Ms. Cuddeback refused to open the door and he kicked the door
open, and Ms. Cuddeback attacked him by grabbing him around the neck and choking
him until he pushed her off of him. (R. 271:113-14, 116.) Ms. Cuddeback then clawed
his face with her fingers outstretched. (R. 271:117-18). After clawing his face,
Ms. Cuddeback punched him in the head, something that left the bruise visible in the
photos introduced at trial. (R. 271:120; State's Exhibit 12 attached at Addendum C.)
According to Mr. Hutchings, Ms. Cuddeback injured her hand when she punched him in
the head. (R. 271:121.) It was undisputed that Mr. Hutchings suffered injuries to his
face, head, and neck during the altercation. (R. 271:10; Add. C.)
According to Ms. Cuddeback, Mr. Hutchings tackled her to the floor and choked
her. (R. 272:53.) Ms. Cuddeback admitted that she then scratched his face and dug her
nails into his forehead. (R. 272:52, 54.) At that point, according to Ms. Cuddeback,
3

Mr. Hutchings threw her hand out of his way "because I was pushing him, trying to get
him off me. And the nails must of hurt him. They were cutting him. He grabbed my
wrist and threw my hand backwards." (R. 272:55.)* Ms. Cuddeback testified that the
altercation ended when she asked, "what are you going to do, kill me?" (R. 272:56.)
Mr. Hutchings then stopped, went to the freezer, and took out a pack of cigarettes.
(R. 272:57.) He then proceeded to fix the broken doorframe by using Ms. Cuddeback's
hiking boot. (R. 272:86.) At the time, neither of them knew her hand was broken, the
only injury that could later support an aggravated assault charge. (R. 272:86.)
After Ms. Cuddeback's testimony, the defense moved for directed verdict.
(R. 271:75.) Trial counsel argued, "what is required in order to establish a prima facie
case of [aggravated assault] is not only that the serious bodily injury was caused but that
it was intentionally caused. And I would remind the court of the testimony of
Ms. Cuddeback, which as I recall, appears to indicate that during the struggle she was
scratching Mr. Hutchings5 face. And according to her testimony he grabbed her hand and
flung it back consistent with somebody trying to get scratching off of their face. I would
indicate to the court that that certainly does not in my view rise to the level of
establishing a prima facie case of intentionally injuring the hand." (R. 271:76-77.) The
trial court denied the motion and later instructed the jury that it need not find that
Mr. Hutchings intended serious bodily injury. (R. 271:80; 253.)

1

(See also R. 272:85 (on cross-examination Ms. Cuddeback reiterated: "Q: And he flung
your right hand, that's the injured hand? A: That would be because I was trying to push
him off."); R. 271:38 (the doctor who treated Ms. Cuddeback testified: "She said that
she'd been assaulted
And as she attempted to scratch her assailant, he grabbed her
arm and flung it backwards, hit a hard object, and she was afraid her hand was broken.").)
4

Summary of the Argument
The trial court instructed the jury that aggravated assault does not require a
specific intent to cause serious bodily injury, but instead requires only that the defendant
intends an act that then results in serious bodily injury. The court of appeals agreed,
citing a case involving a jury instruction for second degree murder—a general intent
crime—not aggravated assault. State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1044 n.l (Utah 1984).
Both the court of appeals and trial court erred. The plain language of the
aggravated assault statute requires that one "intentionally causes serious bodily injury to
another." Utah Code Ann § 76-5-103(l)(a). This court three times has construed that
language to require specific intent to cause serious bodily injury. In re Besendorfer, 568
P.2d 742, 744 (Utah 1977) ("a specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury on the
victim"); State v. Howell 554 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Utah 1976) ("specific intent to inflict
serious bodily harm upon the victim"); State v. Peck, 542 P.2d 1084, 1085 (Utah 1975)
(rejecting that aggravated assault requires only a simple assault that causes serious bodily
injury). Thus, the jury instruction was plainly erroneous under existing law.
And that error was prejudicial, whether viewed under plain error or ineffective
assistance of counsel analysis. Mr. Hutchings stated that Ms. Cuddeback injured her
hand while she was hitting him. Ms. Cuddeback stated that Mr. Hutchings injured her
hand when he pushed her hand away from him to stop her from digging her fingernails
into his face. Neither version of events supports the view that Mr. Hutchings intended
serious bodily injury rather than, at most, intended an act that resulted in injury. Thus,
there is a substantial likelihood that Mr. Hutchings would not have been convicted of
aggravated assault had the jury been properly instructed. This court should reverse.
5

Argument
I.

The Court of Appeals Erred in Holding That Aggravated Assault Is a
General Intent Crime
The trial court erred when it gave a jury instruction describing aggravated assault

as requiring only that Mr. Hutchings intended an act that caused serious bodily injury,
instead of as requiring that Mr. Hutchings have "intentionally cause[d] serious bodily
injury to another," which is the language of the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(a)
(2005).2 The court of appeals then erred in rejecting Mr. Hutchings' argument 'that to be
guilty of aggravated assault he must have intended to cause the serious bodily injury
suffered by the victim, not simply the conduct that resulted in the serious bodily injury."
State v. Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330, H 5, 2009 Utah App. LEXIS 342. The aggravated
assault statute, as well as this court's cases interpreting that statute, plainly requires a
specific intent to cause serious bodily injury, not a general intent to act.
The crime of aggravated assault contains two mens rea requirements. First, the
defendant must "commit assault as defined in § 75-6-102." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5103(l)(a). Section 75-6-102 defines "assault" as "an act, committed with unlawful force
or violence, that causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily
injury to another." IcL § 76-5-102. Because there is no prescribed mens rea for simple
assault, a defendant's conduct may be intentional, knowing, or reckless. Id. Second, and
most important here, to transform simple assault into aggravated assault the defendant

"A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5102 and he: (a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or (b) under
circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (2005) (emphasis added).
6

must "intentionally cause serious bodily injury to another."3 Id § 76-5-103(l)(a). That
language plainly requires the defendant specifically to intend serious bodily injury.
In this case, the jury first was correctly instructed as to the elements of aggravated
assault: "Intentionally or knowingly; Committed an assault on [Ms. Cuddeback]; and
Intentionally caused serious bodily injury to her." (R. 186 (Add. B).) But the jury then
was incorrectly instructed that "intentionally" does not require that Mr. Hutchings intend
the result, i.e., serious bodily injury: "A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with
intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct,
when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result."
(R. 198 (Add. B)); Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330, K 5 (emphasis added). The
combination of these instructions permitted the jury to convict Mr. Hutchings of
aggravated assault whether he merely intended to push Ms. Cuddeback's hand away from
him or intended to cause serious bodily injury to Ms. Cuddeback5s hand.
The court of appeals found no error in the jury instructions based upon the
following analysis, which is quoted in its entirety:
It is enough to satisfy the mens rea requirement if the
defendant intends the act that results in serious bodily injury.
See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1044 n.l (Utah 1984)
(upholding nearly identical instructions for intent).
Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330, ^ 5.4 There are a number of problems with the court of
appeals' abrupt analysis.
3

Because it is undisputed that Mr. Hutchings did not use a dangerous weapon, this brief
ignores the alternative definition of aggravated assault involving the use of a dangerous
weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b).
4
For some reason, the court of appeals cites to the 2008 version of the Utah Code.
Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330, f 4 & n.2. But the 2005 version applies, as the incident
occurred in April 2006. (R. 271:106, 113.) The mistake is inconsequential because the
relevant statutes did not change between 2005 and the 2010 Legislative Session.
7

The first problem is that Fontana upheld a jury instruction for second degree
murder, not aggravated assault. 680 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Utah 1984). The jury instruction
in Fontana stated that second degree murder can be based on three "alternative forms of
conduct." Id. These alternatives included (i) knowingly or intentionally engaging in
conduct that causes the death of another, (ii) acting with the intent to cause serious bodily
injury and committing an act clearly dangerous to human life that results in the death of
another, or (iii) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to a
human life. Id. Thus, the jury instruction in Fontana described a crime that can be
committed with a general intent to act in a manner that results in death.5 Conversely,
aggravated assault requires a specific intent to cause serious bodily injury.6
The second problem with the court of appeals' analysis is that it ignores entirely
three cases in which this court has held that aggravated assault is a specific intent crime
requiring that the defendant intend to cause serious bodily injury. In In re Besendorfer,
this court held that aggravated assault requires proof that "the accused intentionally
caused serious body injury, viz., that he had a specific intent to inflict serious bodily
injury on the victim, and such injuries were, in fact, caused by the assault." 568 P.2d
742, 744 (Utah 1977).7 In State v. Howell this court held that aggravated assault
5

Even today, "[cjriminal homicide constitutes murder in the second degree if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another, (b) intending to cause serious
bodily injury to another, he commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes
the death of another, and (c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life, he engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to
another and thereby causes the death of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1).
6
"A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5102 and he . . . intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-103(l)(a).
The aggravated assault statute in Besendorfer is identical to the statute at issue here.
568 P.2d at 743-44.
8

"requires a specific intent to inflict serious bodily harm upon the victim." 554 P.2d 1326,
1328 (Utah 1976).8 And in State v. Peck this court held that the trial court committed
reversible error when, among other things, it instructed the jury that "a person commits
aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined above and he causes serious bodily
injury to another." 542 P.2d 1084, 1085 (Utah 1975).9 After noting that the instruction
omits the requirement that a defendant intend serious bodily injury, this court observed
that the "instruction would have permitted a verdict of simple assault" rather than
aggravated assault. Id That is precisely what the jury instructions permit here.
Confirming the court of appeals' error, the Legislature in 2010 amended the
aggravated assault statute to transform it from a specific intent crime into a general intent
crime. Starting in November 2010, the statute requires only that a defendant act in a
manner likely to cause serious bodily injury.10 If serious bodily injury in fact results,
then the crime is a second-degree felony; but if no serious bodily injury results, the crime
is only a third-degree felony. The bill explains that the amendment was necessary to
"provide that commission of aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury is a
second degree felony, regardless of whether the actor intended to cause serious bodily
injury." Enrolled Copy of Senate Bill 10, 2010 General Session, at 1:18-20, attached as
Addendum F. Were the court of appeals correct that "[i]t is enough to satisfy the mens
8

The aggravated assault statute in Howell is identical to the statute at issue here. 554
P.2datl328.
9
The aggravated assault statute in Peck is identical to the statute at issue here. 542 P.2d
at 1084.
10
"A person commits aggravated assault if the person commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and uses: (a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury." Utah Code
Ann. §76-5-103(1 )(a) (2010).
9
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A.

The Error in the Jury Instructions Should Have Been Obvious to the
Trial Court and Trial Counsel

As demonstrated above, the plain language of the aggravated assault statute
required the jury to find that Mr. Hutchings intended to cause serious bodily injury to
Ms. Cuddeback's hand. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(a) ("A person commits
aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he...
intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another."). Under Utah law, an error is
obvious when 4Cthe law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was
made." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, % 16, 95 P.3d 276. Here, no fewer than three cases
decided by this court interpret section 76-5-103(1) to require a specific intent to cause
serious bodily injury. In re Besendorfer, 568 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah 1977) ("a specific
intent to inflict serious bodily injury on the victim"); State v. Howell 554 P.2d 1326,
1328 (Utah 1976) ("specific intent to inflict serious bodily harm upon the victim"); State
v. Peck, 542 P.2d 1084, 1085 (Utah 1975) (rejecting that aggravated assault requires only
a simple assault that causes serious bodily injury). Therefore, the error was obvious
under the law governing at the time the error was made in September 2007.
For the same reason, constitutionally effective counsel would have objected to a
jury instruction that expanded the definition of "aggravated assault" to include a mere
intent to act instead of an intent to cause serious bodily injury. The erroneous instruction
freed the State from proving every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt, namely
that Mr. Hutchings intended to cause serious injury to Ms. Cuddeback. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-501. Here, trial counsel's error was particularly puzzling in light of the fact that
he moved for directed verdict on the ground that there was no evidence that
Mr. Hutchings specifically intended serious bodily injury to Ms. Cuddeback. (R. 271:7611
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Similarly, counsel's deficient performance is prejudicial when 'there is a
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the fact-finder would have had a reasonable
doubt respecting guilt." State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, «|| 86,152 P.3d 321. "A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the jury verdict." Id,
Here, the error was prejudicial. Had the jury not been instructed that it could
convict Mr. Hutchings of aggravated assault if it found that he intended an act that
resulted in serious bodily injury, it likely would have concluded that the evidence does
not support an aggravated assault conviction, especially beyond a reasonable doubt.
While the jury clearly believed Ms. Cuddeback's version of events, her version supports
only a finding that Mr. Hutchings intended an act that then caused serious bodily injury to
her hand. According to Ms. Cuddeback, Mr. Hutchings took her hand and threw it back
into a bookshelf in order to stop her from digging her fingernails into his face.
The prosecutor then specifically told the jury in closing argument that an intent to
act was sufficient for aggravated assault. Specifically, the prosecutor told the jury that
Mr. Hutchings intentionally broke Ms. Cuddeback's hand "because he grabbed her hand
and he threw it back behind her head" and therefore "intentionally caused the serious
bodily injury." (R. 178). The prosecutor then reiterated that because Mr. Hutchings'
actions were not accidental, they were intentional, and, therefore, Mr. Hutchings
intentionally broke her hand. (R. 207). Coupled with the erroneous instruction and lack
of any evidence that Mr. Hutchings intended serious bodily injury, the prosecutor's
statements make it very likely that the jury convicted Mr. Hutchings of aggravated assault
for his intent to engage in conduct, not to cause the result of serious bodily injury. The
error was therefore prejudicial.
13

Conclusion
1 1 lis coi n I: si ic I ild \ acate Mi I lutchh igs' ' conviction for aggravated assami
trial court plain* - <-rred, and trial counsel was constitutionally iiict'iectiN <. v u . -

,l

.

i ;•<>
•y

was instructed iiut; a need only find that Mr. Hutchings intended to engage in v rni^ \
instead of intended the resi lit, tc lie gi lilty c f aggra \ ated assa
prejudiciaL as Iheie was no e\ uicncc that Mr. Hutchings intended serious hodih imun
• M.<-:
intended scrion
conviction

I
Ju\ m-iin

lat itneeu ..<•; :.i.< ;iu., .

uucliings

...us, the court of appeal cued ai diiirmmg hi^

i in.*, court should reverse

DATED thi^ 24

'••;•••
SNliLI,& WlI,MKR 1 J P.

1 roy I . Boohcr /
:•• -Merine Carrdiu
Attorneys for Appellant Larry Lewis Hutchings

14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 24th day of August, 2010, two true and correct copies
of the foregoing Opening Brief of Appellant were sent via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to:
Ryan D. Tenney
Office of the Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

15

Addenda
Minutes
Addendui

> i Ki t C x M ; ; i

Addendun \ ',i. .war.

Scnfrmv lndommt Copmiitmcni (R 7">u_^f))

.).

Addendum F/:

Phnn\«rap*» ^tpir's Exhibii :
1 State v. Hutchings, 2009 ITT Apr °10. "009

• JeUTinmalivr [Provisions:
, iai; L ode /\nn. § /(>-_ aL. (JWID)
I »tah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2005)
!'tah (ode Ann S 7n-^ Mn Hnn%i

Addendum F:

11862647

nrohed I on\ oi Nenale lii

2010 General Session

Tab A

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 061902496 FS

LARRY LEWIS HUTCHINCS,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

DENNIS M FUCHS
October 22, 2007

PRESENT
Clerk:
patd
Prosecutor: PARKINSON, PATRICIA
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): LJUNGBERG, ROBIN K
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: February 16, 1965
Video
Tape Number:
S42
Tape Count: 21746
CHARGES
2. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/04/2007 Guilty
3. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/04/2007 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
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Case No: 061902496
Date:
Oct 22, 2007

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
RUN CONSECTIVELY TO TIME NOW SERVING AT UTAH STATE PRISON

SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
DEFENDANT GIVEN CREDIT FOR TIME SERVE ON COUNT 2
MISCHIEF

CRIMINAL

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 2

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$10,000
$0.00
$8525.00
$18525.00

Charge # 3
Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$10000
$0
$8525.00
$18525
Plus Interest
Attorney Fees
Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: S L ATTORNEYS FEES S L COUNTY ATTORNEY
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE
STATE HAS 60 DAYS TO PROVIDE ANY RESTITUTION INFO

Dated t h i s
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. 20&Z.

At/
•£•5'' **'

District

Cou]
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

)

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

1

Case No. 061902496 FS

Plaintiff,
vs.
LARRY LEWIS HUTCHINGS,
Defendant,

]
;

Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs

The Court, in its charge to the jury, gives the following instructions numbered one (1) through
( /&)

inclusive.

INSTRUCTION NO.

/

/

Before you can convict the defendant, LARRY HUTCHINGS, of the crime of
Aggravated Assault, as charged in count II of the information, you must find from all of the
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements of that
offense:
1. That on or about April 6, 2006, in Salt Lake County, Utah, the defendant, LARRY
HUTCHINGS;
2. Intentionally or knowingly;
3. Committed an assault on Deborah Cuddeback; and
4. Intentionally caused serious bodily injury to her.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault as charged in count II of the information. If, on
the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of count II.

INSTRUCTION NO.

ir

"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or
creates a substantial risk of death.

INSTRUCTION NO.
A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct
or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20080681-CA
F I L E D
(November 13, 2009)

Larry Lewis Hutchings,
Defendant and Appellant.

2009 UT App 330

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 0619024 96
The Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs
Attorneys:

Ronald Fujino, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Ryan D. Tenney, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Thorne, and McHugh.
McHUGH, Judge:
Larry Lewis Hutchings appeals his convictions for aggravated
assault and criminal mischief. Hutchings raises multiple issues
on appeal, challenging his convictions. With respect to all but
one of those issues, Hutchings!s lawyer has filed an Anders
brief, and Hutchings has filed a memorandum to supplement
counsel's brief. See generally Anders v. California, 3 86 U.S.
738 (1967) (describing the procedures that appointed counsel must
follow when he believes his client!s claims on appeal are
frivolous); State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 169-70 (Utah 1981)
(adopting Anders requirements "as an expression of the
requirements of due process of law" under the Utah Constitution).
Because our independent review convinces us that the issues
identified by Hutchings*s counsel in the Anders brief (the Anders
issues) are indeed frivolous, see generally State v. Romano, 2 9
Utah 2d 237, 507 P.2d 1025, 1025 (1973) (defining "frivolous" as
"having no basis in fact or law"), we do not consider those
issues further. See Clayton, 63 9 P.2d at 170 (holding that an
appellate court may grant a withdrawal and affirm a conviction if
it unanimously determines that an appeal is wholly frivolous).

Apart from the Anders issues, appellate counsel argues that
the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the culpable
mental state required for aggravated assault and the definition
of "intentional."1 "Whether a jury instruction correctly states
the law presents a question of law which we review for
correctness." State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, H 13, 193 P.3d 92.
The jury instruction on aggravated assault provided,
Before you can convict . . . HUTCHINGS
. . . of Aggravated Assault, . . . you must
find from all of the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt, each and every one of the
following elements of that offense:
1. That on or about April 6, 2006, in
Salt Lake County, Utah, . . . HUTCHINGS;
2.

Intentionally or knowingly;

3. Committed an assault on [his
girlfriend]; and
4. Intentionally caused serious bodily
injury to her.
We agree with the State that the jury instruction correctly
listed the elements of aggravated assault, including the culpable
mental states.
Aggravated assault requires that a person commit "assault as
defined in [Utah Code s]ection 76-5-102, and . . . intentionally
cause [] serious bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann. § 765-103(1)(a) (2008) (emphasis added). 2 An "[a]ssault is . . . an
act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes
bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily
injury to another." Id. § 76-5-102. Because the assault statute
does not provide the culpable mental state required to support a
Although Hutchings failed to object to these instructions
in the trial court, he requests that we review them under the
plain error doctrine. The State does not contest our review of
these issues.
2

Because it is irrelevant to this appeal, we need not
address the alternative element of aggravated assault, that is,
the use of a dangerous weapon or other means likely to produce
death in the commission of the assault, see Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 5-103(1) (b) (2008) .

onoonco1.pa

2

conviction, "intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to
establish criminal responsibility." Id. § 76-2-102. To be
liable for aggravated assault, however, the defendant must also
have intentionally caused serious bodily injury. See id. § 76-5103(1) (a) . Thus, there are actually two mens rea requirements
that must be met to convict a defendant of aggravated assault:
the first is the intent, knowledge, or recklessness included in a
simple assault charge; the second is the requirement that the
defendant intentionally cause serious bodily injury. The
challenged jury instruction correctly identified each of these
mental state requirements.3 Accordingly, we reject counsel's
claim that the jury instruction was erroneous.4
Finally, Hutchings challenges the instruction to the jury
that defined "intentional" conduct. That instruction stated, "A
person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Hutchings
argues that to be guilty of aggravated assault he must have
intended to cause the serious bodily injury suffered by the
victim, not simply the conduct that resulted in the serious
bodily injury. We disagree. It is enough to satisfy the mens
rea requirement if the defendant intends the act that results in
serious bodily injury. See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1044
n.l (Utah 1984) (upholding nearly identical instructions for
intent).
Because counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and because we confirm that
the Anders issues are frivolous, we grant counsel's request to
withdraw with respect to the Anders issues only and affirm the
trial court's rulings with respect to those issues. In addition,
the jury instructions properly informed the jury of the elements

3

Indeed, by not including recklessness as a basis for a
finding of assault, the State was held to a higher standard of
proof for that mens rea element than required by the statute.
4

Because we conclude that the jury instruction was proper,
we need not address Hutchings's claim that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial lawyer failed to
object to the instruction.

20080681-CA

1

of aggravated assault, including the mental states required.
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge

I CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102
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TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 2. PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
PART 1. CULPABILITY GENERALLY
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (2005)
§ 76-2-102. Culpable mental state required — Strict liability
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental state, and when the definition of the
offense does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge,
or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute
defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the
conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state.

HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-2-102, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-102; 1983, ch. 90, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

±

Depraved indifference.
Jury instructions.

±

Relation to other sections.

±

Cited.
DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE.
In a prosecution for second degree murder, although the court's jury instruction did not expressly treat the
element of knowledge, there was no error since the other jury instructions and the evidence of the defendant's
actions left little room for the jury to misunderstand that the defendant must have been aware that his conduct
created a grave risk of death to another, within the definitions contained in the instructions. State v. Fontana, 680
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984).
JURY INSTRUCTIONS.
Requisite state of mind for a violation of the Utah Bail Bond Recovery Act, Utah Code Ann. 5 53-11-107r is intent,
knowledge, or recklessness; therefore, a trial court properly instructed the jury on the required mental state because
it was not classified as a strict liability crime. State v. Norton, 2003 UT App 88, 67 P.3d 1050.
RELATION TO OTHER SECTIONS.
In light of this section and § 32A-12-104, under § 32A-12-203(1), if a person recklessly provides alcohol to a
minor, that person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor; however,under § 32A-12-203(2) if a person knowingly
provides alcohol to a minor that person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. State v. Valdez, 933 P.2d 400 (Utah Ct.
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TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 5. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON
PART 1. ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2005)
§ 76-5-102. Assault
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial
risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to another.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 2 , enacted by L. 1974, ch. 32, § 38; 1989, ch. 5 1 , § 1; 1991, ch. 75, § 3; 1995, ch.
291, § 4; 1996, ch. 140, § 1; 2000, ch. 170, § 2; 2003, ch. 109, § 1.
NOTES: REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. -Laws 1974, ch. 32, § 38 repealed former § 76-5-102, as enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-102, relating to assault, and enacted present § 76-5-102.
AMENDMENT NOTES. - T h e 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, added the Subsection (3)(a) designation,
added Subsection (3)(b), and made two related changes.
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, added "bodily injury to another" in Subsection (l)(c).
CROSS-REFERENCES. -Bus hijacking, assault with intent to commit, § 76-10-1504.
Power of city to prohibit assault and battery, § 10-8-47.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
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TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 5. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON
PART 1 . ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103

(2005)

§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault

(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 2 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection ( l ) ( a ) , uses a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection ( l ) ( a ) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection ( l ) ( b ) is a third degree felony.

HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10; 1989, ch. 170, § 2;
1995, ch. 291, § 5.
NOTES: CROSS-REFERENCES. - A t t e m p t , § 7 6 - 4 - 1 0 1 .
Possession of a dangerous weapon with intent to assault, § 76-10-507.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Dangerous weapon.

±
Defense of habitation.
Evidence.
— Sufficient.
Included offense.
Indictment or information.

±
Instructions.

±

— Citizen's arrest.
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1

CRIMINAL OFFENSE PENALTIES

2

AMENDMENTS

3

2010 GENERAL SESSION

4

STATE OF UTAH

5

Chief Sponsor: Jon J. Greiner

6

House Sponsor: Curtis Oda

7

===============

8

LONG TITLE

9

General Description:

10

This bill modifies provisions of the Criminal Code regarding elements of specified

11

criminal offenses and regarding the dollar value of damage used to determine levels of

12

criminal offenses.

13

Highlighted Provisions:

14

This bill:

15

•

applies the enhanced penalty that currently applies to persons committing a crime

16

in concert with two or more persons to persons who commit any of the listed

17

offenses in association with a criminal street gang;

18

•

provides that commission of aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury is

19

a second degree felony, regardless of whether the actor intended to cause serious

20

bodily injury;

21

•

modifies the penalty for a second offense of theft, or of robbery or burglary with the

22

intent to commit theft, to require that the second offense be committed or the

23

conviction obtained within 10 years prior to the current theft offense;

24

•

modifies the factors considered by the juvenile court in hearings to certify a

15

juvenile to stand trial as an adult to include if the juvenile engaged in criminal

16

activity in association with a criminal street gang;

11
18
19

•

modifies the definition of a criminal nuisance to include criminal activity

conducted in association with a criminal street gang; and
•

modifies the dollar value of damage that determines the levels of offense for

S.B. 10

Enrolled Copy

30

offenses, including arson, criminal mischief, theft, various fraud offenses, unlawful dealing by

31

a fiduciary, destruction of livestock, reckless burning, computer crimes, bad checks, mortgage

32

fraud, and theft of utility services.

33

Monies Appropriated in this Bill:

34
35
36

None
Other Special Clauses:
This bill provides an effective date of November 1, 2010.

37

Utah Code Sections Affected:

38

AMENDS:

39

9-4-612, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2007, Chapter 322

40

63M-7-510, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2008, Chapter 339 and renumbered and

41

amended by Laws of Utah 2008, Chapter 382

42

76-3-203.1, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2009, Chapter 157

43

76-5-103, as last amended by Laws of Utah 1995, Chapter 291

44

76-6-101, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2009, Chapter 320

45

76-6-102, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2004, Chapter 134

46

76-6-104, as last amended by Laws of Utah 1998, Chapter 71

47

76-6-106, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2002, Chapter 166

48

76-6-111, as enacted by Laws of Utah 2009, Chapter 282

49

76-6-409.3, as last amended by Laws of Utah 1995, Chapter 291

50

76-6-412, as last amended by Laws of Utah 1997, Chapters 119 and 289

51

76-6-505, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2007, Chapter 306

52

76-6-506.5, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2009, Chapter 166

53

76-6-513, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2008, Chapter 382

54

76-6-518, as last amended by Laws of Utah 1995, Chapter 291

55

76-6-608, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2003, Chapter 173

56

76-6-703, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2005, Chapter 72

57

76-6-1204, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2009, Chapter 211

Enrolled Copy
58

76-8-1206, as last amended by Laws of Utah 1995, Chapter 291

59

76-8-1301, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2008, Chapter 305

60

76-10-1801, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2009, Chapter 211

61

78A-6-703, as renumbered and amended by Laws of Utah 2008, Chapter 3

62

78B-6-1101, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2009, Chapter 21

63

78B-6-1107, as renumbered and amended by Laws of Utah 2008, Chapter 3
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64
65

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

66

Section 1. Section 9-4-612 is amended to read:

67

9-4-612. Penalties for fraudulently obtaining or continuing to receive housing

68

assistance benefits.

69

(1) No person may knowingly, by misrepresentation, impersonation, or any other

70

fraudulent means, make any false statement to housing authority personnel or, after being

71

accepted as a recipient of housing authority benefits, fail to disclose to housing authority

72

personnel any:

73

(a) change in household composition;

74

(b) employment change;

75

(c) change in marital status;

76

(d) receipt of any other monetary assistance;

77

(e) receipt of in-kind gifts; or

78

(f) any other material fact or change in circumstances which would affect the

79

determination of that person's eligibility to receive housing assistance benefits, or would affect

80

the amount of benefits for which he is eligible.

81

(2) No person may fail to disclose any of the information described in Subsection (1)

82

for the purpose of obtaining or continuing to receive funds or other housing assistance benefits

83

to which he is not entitled, or in an amount larger than that to which he is entitled.

84
85

(3) No person who has duties relating to the administration of any housing authority
program may fraudulently misappropriate any funds or other assistance with which he has

S.B. 10
86

Enrolled Copy

been entrusted, or of which he has gained possession by virtue of his position.

87

(4) No person may knowingly:

88

(a) file or falsify any claim, report, or document required by state or federal law, or

89

provider agreement, to obtain or attempt to obtain unauthorized housing assistance benefits

90

under this chapter; or

91
92
93

(b) attempt to commit, or aid or abet the commission of, any act prohibited by this
section.
(5) The punishment for violation of any provision of this section by a housing

94

assistance recipient is determined by the cumulative value of the funds or other benefits he

95

received from all the frauds he committed, and not by each separate instance of fraud.

96

(6) The punishment for the offenses of this section are:

97

(a) a [felony of the] second degree felony if the value of the funds or other benefits

98
99

received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for, is equal to or exceeds $5,000;
(b) a [felony of the] third degree felony if the value of the funds or other benefits

100

received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for, is equal to or greater than [$1,000] $L500

101

but less than $5,000;

102

(c) a class A misdemeanor if the value of the funds or other benefits received,

103

misappropriated, claimed, or applied for, is equal to or greater than [$300] $500 but less than

104

[$*reee] $1,500: or

105

(d) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the funds or other benefits received,

106

misappropriated, claimed, or applied for, is less than [$300] $500.

107

Section 2. Section 63M-7-510 is amended to read:

108

63M-7-510. Ineligible persons — Fraudulent claims « Penalties.

109

(1) The following individuals are not eligible to receive an award of reparations:

[10

(a) persons who do not meet all of the provisions set forth in Section 63M-7-509;

111

(b) the offender;

12

(c) an accomplice of the offender;

13

(d) any person whose receipt of an award would unjustly benefit the offender,

Enrolled Copy
114
115

accomplice, or other person reasonably suspected of participating in the offense;
(e) the victim of a motor vehicle injury who was the owner or operator of the motor

[16

vehicle and was not at the time of the injury in compliance with the state motor vehicle

117

insurance laws;

18
19
20
21
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(f) any convicted offender serving a sentence of imprisonment in any prison or jail or
residing in any other correctional facility;
(g) all persons who are on probation or parole if the circumstances surrounding the
offense of which they are victims constitute a violation of their parole or probation; and

22

(h) any person whose injuries are the result of criminally injurious conduct which

23

occurred in a prison, jail, or any other correctional facility while the person was serving a

24

sentence of imprisonment.

25

(2) A person who knowingly submits a fraudulent claim for reparations or who

26

knowingly misrepresents material facts in making a claim, and who receives an award based

27

on that claim, is guilty of an offense, based on the following award amounts:

28

(a) for value under [$300] $500, a class B misdemeanor;

29

(b) for value equal to or greater than [$306] $500, but less than [$1,000] $1,500, a

30
31
32

class A misdemeanor;
(c) for value equal to or greater than [$1,000] $1,500, but less than $5,000, a third
degree felony; and

33

(d) for value equal to or greater than $5,000, a second degree felony.

34

(3) A person who submits a claim described in Subsection (2) but receives no award

55
56

based on that claim is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(4) The state attorney general may prosecute violations under this section or may make

57

arrangements with county attorneys for the prosecution of violations under this section when

58

the attorney general cannot conveniently prosecute.

(9

(5) The state may also bring a civil action against a claimant who receives reparation

\0

payments that are later found to be unjustified and who does not return to the Crime Victim

1

Reparations Fund the unjustified amount.
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Section 3. Section 76-3-203.1 is amended to read:

143

76-3-203.1. Offenses committed in concert with two or more persons or in

144

relation to a criminal street gang — Notice — Enhanced penalties.

145

(1) As used in this section:

146

(a) "Criminal street gang" has the same definition as in Section 76-9-802.

147

(b) "In concert with two or more persons" means:

148

(i) the defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in committing

149

the offense and was aware of this aid or encouragement; and

150

(ii) each of the other persons:

151

(A) was physically present; or

152

(B) participated as a party to any offense listed in Subsection (5).

153

(c) "In concert with two or more persons" means, regarding intent:

154

(i) other persons participating as parties need not have the intent to engage in the same

155
156
157
158

offense or degree of offense as the defendant; and
(ii) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause the minor to be a party if the
minor were an adult.
[(1) (a)] (2) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection [(4)] £5} is subject

159

to an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided in Subsection [{3}] (4) if the trier of fact

160

finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person acted;

161

(a) in concert with two or more persons [?];

162

[(b) "hi concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the defendant
was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in committing the offense and was
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[(ii) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause him to be a party if he were
an adult.]
(b) for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang
as defined in Section 76-9-802; or
(c) to gain recognition, acceptance, membership, or increased status with a criminal
street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802.
[(2)] £3} The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, shall

77

cause to be subscribed upon the information or indictment notice that the defendant is subject

78

to the enhanced penalties provided under this section.

79

[(3)] £4} The enhanced penalty for a:

80

(a) class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor;

81

(b) class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony;

82

(c) third degree felony is a second degree felony;

83

(d) second degree felony is a first degree felony; and

84

(e) first degree felony is an indeterminate prison term of not less than five years in

85

addition to the statutory minimum prison term for the offense, and which may be for life.

86

[(4)] £51 Offenses referred to in Subsection Ri)] £2} are:

87

(a) any criminal violation of [Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, regarding

88

drug-related offenses;] the following chapters of Title 58:

89

(i) Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act:

90

(ii) Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act;

91

(iii) Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act: or

92

(iv) Chapter 37c, Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act;

93

(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1, Assault and Related

94
95
96
97

Offenses;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2, Criminal
Homicide;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3, Kidnapping,

S.B. 10
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Trafficking, and Smuggling;

199

(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses;

200

(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3;

201

(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1, Property

202

Destruction;

203
204

(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2,
Burglary and Criminal Trespass;

205

(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3, Robbery;

206

(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4, Theft, or Part 6, Retail

207
208

Theft;
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 76-6-504,

209

76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514,

210

76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520;

211
212

(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Title 76, Chapter 8, Part 3,
except Sections'76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312;

213

(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508;

214

(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509;

215

(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3, Explosives;

216

(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5, Weapons;

217

(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses under Title 76,

218

Chapter 10, Part 12, Pornographic and Harmful Materials and Performances;

219

(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13, Prostitution;

220

(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety Act;

221

(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act;

222

(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801;

223

(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering and Currency

224
225

Transaction Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002.
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[(5)] £6} It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section that the

127

persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not identified,

128

apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are charged with or convicted

129

of a different or lesser offense.

130

Section 4. Section 76-5-103 is amended to read:

31

76-5-103. Aggravated assault.

32

(1) A person commits aggravated assault if [he] the person commits assault as defined

33

in Section 76-5-102 and [he] uses:

34

[(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or]

35

[(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses]

36

£a} a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or

37

£b] other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.

38

(2) £a} A violation of Subsection [(l)(a)] £1} is a [second] third degree felony, except

39
40
41

under Subsection (DCoi).
[f3)] (b} A violation of Subsection (l)[fb)] that results in serious bodily injury is a
[third] second degree felony.

42

Section 5. Section 76-6-101 is amended to read:

43

76-6-101. Definitions.

44

For purposes of this chapter:

45

(1) "Property" means any form of real property or tangible personal property which is

46
M

capable of being damaged or destroyed and includes a habitable structure.
(2) "Habitable structure" means any building, vehicle, trailer, railway car, aircraft, or

48

watercraft used for lodging or assembling persons or conducting business whether a person is

\9

actually present or not.

50
51

(3) "Property" is that of another, if anyone other than the actor has a possessory or
proprietary interest in any portion thereof.

52

(4) "Value" means:

)3

(a) The market value of the property, if totally destroyed, at the time and place of the

S.B. 10
254
255
256
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offense, or where cost of replacement exceeds the market value; or
(b) Where the market value cannot be ascertained, the cost of repairing or replacing
the property within a reasonable time following the offense.

257

(5) If the property damaged has a value that cannot be ascertained by the criteria set

258

forth in Subsections (4)(a) and (b), the property shall be considered to have a value less than

259

[$306] $500.

260
261

(6) "Fire" means a flame, heat source capable of combustion, or material capable of
combustion that is caused, set, or maintained by a person for any purpose.

262

Section 6. Section 76-6-102 is amended to read:

263

76-6-102. Arson.

264

(1) A person is guilty of arson ifA under circumstances not amounting to aggravated

265

arson, [by means of fire or explosives,] the person by means of fire or explosives unlawfully

266

and intentionally damages:

267

(a) any property with intention of defrauding an insurer; or

268

(b) the property of another.

269

(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.

270

(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is:

271

(a) a second degree felony if:

272

(i) the damage caused is or exceeds $5,000 in value; or

273

(ii) as a proximate result of the fire or explosion, any person not a participant in the

274

offense suffers serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601;

275

(b) a third degree felony if:

276

(i) the damage caused is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than $5,000 in value;

277

(ii) as a proximate result of the fire or explosion, any person not a participant in the

278

offense suffers substantial bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601; or

279

(iii) the fire or explosion endangers human life;

280

(c) a class A misdemeanor if the damage caused is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is less

281

than [$1,000] $1,500 in value; and
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182

(d) a class B misdemeanor if the damage caused is less than [$360] $500.

183

Section 7. Section 76-6-104 is amended to read:

184

76-6-104. Reckless burning.

185

(1) A person is guilty of reckless burning if the person:

186

(a) recklessly starts a fire or causes an explosion which endangers human life;

187

(b) having started a fire, whether recklessly or not, and knowing that it is spreading

188

and will endanger the life or property of another, either fails to take reasonable measures to put

189

out or control the fire or fails to give a prompt fire alarm;

190

(c) builds or maintains a fire without taking reasonable steps to remove all flammable

191

materials surrounding the site of the fire as necessary to prevent the fire's spread or escape; or

192

(d) damages the property of another by reckless use of fire or causing an explosion.

193

(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) or (b) is a class A misdemeanor.

194

(b) A violation of Subsection (l)(c) is a class B misdemeanor.

195

(c) A violation of Subsection (l)(d) is:

96

(i) a class A misdemeanor if damage to property is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 in

,97
,98
,99
00
01

value;
(ii) a class B misdemeanor if the damage to property is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is
less than [$1,000] $L500 in value; and
(iii) a class C misdemeanor if the damage to property is or exceeds $150 but is less
than [$300] $500 in value.

02

(d) Any other violation under Subsection (l)(d) is an infraction.

03

Section 8. Section 76-6-106 is amended to read:

04

76-6-106. Criminal mischief.

05

(1) As used in this section, "critical infrastructure" includes:

06

(a) information and communication systems;

07

(b) financial and banking systems;

08

(c) transportation systems;

09

(d) any public utility service, including the power, energy, and water supply systems;

S.B. 10
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310

(e) sewage and water treatment systems;

311

(f) health care facilities as listed in Section 26-21-2, and emergency fire, medical, and

312

law enforcement response systems;

313

(g) public health facilities and systems;

314

(h) food distribution systems; and

315

(i) other government operations and services.

316

(2) A person commits criminal mischief if the person:

317

(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys property with

318

the intention of defrauding an insurer;

319

(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of another and as a result:

320

(i) recklessly endangers:

321

(A) human life; or

322

(B) human health or safety; or

323

(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or impairment of any

324

critical infrastructure;

325

(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another; or

326

(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object at or against a

327

motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car, or caboose, whether moving

328

or standing.

329

(3) (a) (i) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a third degree felony.

$30

(ii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(A) is a class A misdemeanor.

531

(iii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(B) is a class B misdemeanor.

J32

(iv) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(ii) is a second degree felony.

*33

(b) Any other violation of this section is a:

(34

(i) second degree felony if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary

135

36
37

loss equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value;

(ii) third degree felony if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary
loss equal to or in excess of [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than $5,000 in value;
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338

(iii) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause

339

pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of [$966] $566 but is less than [$1,666] $1,500 in value;

340

and

341
342
543

(iv) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause
pecuniary loss less than [$300] $500 in value.
(4) In determining the value of damages under this section, or for computer crimes

544

under Section 76-6-703, the value of any item, computer, computer network, computer

545

property, computer services, software, or data includes the measurable value of the loss of use

546

of the items and the measurable cost to replace or restore the items.

547

(5) In addition to any other penalty authorized by law, a court shall order any person

548

convicted of any violation of this section to reimburse any federal, state, or local unit of

549

government, or any private business, organization, individual, or entity for all expenses

550

incurred in responding to a violation of Subsection (2)(b)(ii), unless the court states on the

!51

record the reasons why the reimbursement would be inappropriate.

>52

Section 9. Section 76-6-111 is amended to read:

153

76-6-111. Wanton destruction of livestock — Penalties — Seizure and disposition

154

of property.

>55

(1) As used in this section:

56

(a) "Law enforcement officer" is as defined in Section 53-13-103.

•57

(b) "Livestock" means a domestic animal or fur bearer raised or kept for profit,

58

including:

59

(i) cattle;

60

(ii) sheep;

61

(iii) goats;

62

(iv) swine;

63

(v) horses;

64

(vi) mules;

65

(vii) poultry; and
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366

(viii) domesticated elk as defined in Section 4-39-102.

367

(2) Unless authorized by Section 4-25-4, 4-25-5, 4-25-14,4-39-401, or 18-1-3, a

368

person is guilty of wanton destruction of livestock if that person:

369

(a) injures, physically alters, releases, or causes the death of livestock; and

370

(b) does so:

371

(i) intentionally or knowingly; and

372

(ii) without the permission of the owner of the livestock.

373

(3) Wanton destruction of livestock is punishable as a:

374

(a) class B misdemeanor if the aggregate value of the livestock is [$300] $500 or less;

375

(b) class A misdemeanor if the aggregate value of the livestock is more than [$300]

376
377
378

$500, but does not exceed [$1,000] $1,500:
(c) third degree felony if the aggregate value of the livestock is more than [$1,000]
$1,500, but does not exceed $5,000; and

379

(d) second degree felony if the aggregate value of the livestock is more than $5,000.

380

(4) A material, device, or vehicle used in violation of Subsection (2) is subject to

381

forfeiture under the procedures and substantive protections established in Title 24, Chapter 1,

382

Utah Uniform Forfeiture Procedures Act.

383
384
385
386

(5) A peace officer may seize a material, device, or vehicle used in violation of
Subsection (2):
(a) upon notice and service of process issued by a court having jurisdiction over the
property; or

587

(b) without notice and service of process if:

588

(i) the seizure is incident to an arrest under:

589

(A) a search warrant; or

190

(B) an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant;

191

(ii) the material, device, or vehicle has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of

192
93

the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this section; or
(iii) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has been used in
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violation of Subsection (2).
(6) (a) A material, device, or vehicle seized under this section is not repleviable but is

396

in custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the orders and

397

decrees of a court or official having jurisdiction.

398

(b) A peace officer who seizes a material, device, or vehicle under this section may:

399

(i) place the property under seal;

100

(ii) remove the property to a place designated by the warrant under which it was

101
102
103

seized; or
(iii) take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location for
disposition in accordance with law.

104

Section 10. Section 76-6-409.3 is amended to read:

105

76-6-409.3. Theft of utility or cable television services -- Restitution -- Civil

K)6

action for damages.

107

(1) As used in this section:

108

(a) "Cable television service" means any audio, video, or data service provided by a

109

cable television company over its cable system facilities for payment, but does not include the

U0

use of a satellite dish or antenna.

HI

(b) "Owner" includes any part-owner, joint owner, tenant in common, joint tenant, or

U2

tenant by the entirety of the whole or a part of any building and the property on which it is

H3

located.

H4
H5
H6
H7
H8

(c) "Person" means any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, company,
association, or other legal entity.
(d) "Tenant or occupant" includes any person, including the owner, who occupies the
whole or part of any building, whether alone or with others.
(e) "Utility" means any public utility, municipally-owned utility, or cooperative utility

U9

which provides electricity, gas, water, or sewer, or any combination of them, for sale to

h20

consumers.

•21

(2) A person is guilty of theft of a utility or cable television service if the person

S.B. 10
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422

commits any prohibited acts which make gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable television

423

available to a tenant or occupant, including himself, with intent to avoid due payment to the

424

utility or cable television company. Any person aiding and abetting in these prohibited acts is

425

a party to the offense under Section 76-2-202. Prohibited acts include:

426

(a) connecting any tube, pipe, wire, cable, or other instrument with any meter, device,

427

or other instrument used for conducting gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable television in a

428

manner as permits the use of the gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable television without its

429

passing through a meter or other instrument recording the usage for billing;

430

(b) altering, injuring, or preventing the normal action of a meter, valve, stopcock, or

431

other instrument used for measuring quantities of gas, electricity, water, or sewer service, or

432

making or maintaining any modification or alteration to any device installed with the

433

authorization of a cable television company for the purpose of intercepting or receiving any

434

program or other service carried by the company which the person is not authorized by the

435

company to receive;

436

(c) reconnecting gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable television connections or

437

otherwise restoring service when one or more of those utilities or cable service have been

438

lawfully disconnected or turned off by the provider of the utility or cable service;

439

(d) intentionally breaking, defacing, or causing to be broken or defaced any seal,

440

locking device, or other part of a metering device for recording usage of gas, electricity, water,

141

or sewer service, or a security system for the recording device, or a cable television control

142

device;

M3
144
45
46
47

(e) removing a metering device designed to measure quantities of gas, electricity,
water, or sewer service;
(f) transferring from one location to another a metering device for measuring
quantities of public utility services of gas, electricity, water, or sewer service;
(g) changing the indicated consumption, jamming the measuring device, bypassing the

48

meter or measuring device with a jumper so that it does not indicate use or registers use

49

incorrectly, or otherwise obtaining quantities of gas, electricity, water, or sewer service from

Enrolled Copy
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the utility without their passing through a metering device for measuring quantities of

[51

consumption for billing purposes;

t52
L53
1-54
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(h) using a metering device belonging to the utility that has not been assigned to the
location and installed by the utility;
(i) fabricating or using a device to pick or otherwise tamper with the locks used to

1-55

deter utility service diversion, meter tampering, meter thefts, and unauthorized cable television

1^56

service;

157

(j) assisting or instructing any person in obtaining or attempting to obtain any cable

1^58

television service without payment of all lawful compensation to the c o m p a n y providing the

k59

service;

^60

(k) making or maintaining a connection or connections, whether physical, electrical,

•61

mechanical, acoustical, or by other means, with any cables, wires, components, or other

62

devices used for the distribution of cable television services without authority from the cable

63

television company; or

64

(1) possessing without authority any device or printed circuit board designed in whole

65

or in part to receive any cable television programming or services offered for sale over a cable

66

television system with the intent that the device or printed circuit be used for the reception of

67

the cable television company's services without payment. For purposes of this subsection,

68

device or printed circuit board does not include the use of a satellite dish or antenna.

69

(3) The presence on property in the possession of a person of any device or alteration

70

which permits the diversion or use of utility or cable service to avoid the registration of the use

71

by or on a meter installed by the utility or to otherwise avoid the recording of use of the service

72

for payment or otherwise avoid payment gives rise to an inference that the person in

73

possession of the property installed the device or caused the alteration if:

74
75
76
77

(a) the presence of the device or alteration can be attributed only to a deliberate act in
furtherance of an intent to avoid payment for utility or cable television service; and
(b) the person charged has received the direct benefit of the reduction of the cost of the
utility or cable television service.
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(4) A person who violates this section is guilty of the offense of theft of utility or cable
television service.
(a) In the case of theft of utility services, if the value of the gas, electricity, water, or
sewer service:

482

(i) is less than [$300] $500, the offense is a class B misdemeanor;

483

(ii) is or exceeds [$306] $500 but is not more than [$1,000] $1,500. the offense is a

484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491

class A misdemeanor;
(iii) is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is not more than $5,000, the offense is a third
degree felony; and
(iv) is or exceeds $5,000 or if the offender has previously been convicted of a violation
of this section, the offense is a second degree felony.
(b) In the case of theft of cable television services, the penalties are prescribed in
Section 76-6-412.
(5) A person who violates this section shall make restitution to the utility or cable

492

television company for the value of the gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable television service

493

consumed in violation of this section plus all reasonable expenses and costs incurred on

494

account of the violation of this section. Reasonable expenses and costs include expenses and

495

costs for investigation, disconnection, reconnection, service calls, employee time, and

496

equipment use.

497

(6) Criminal prosecution under this section does not affect the right of a utility or

•98

cable television company to bring a civil action for redress for damages suffered as a result of

199

the commission of any of the acts prohibited by this section.

500
501

(7) This section does not abridge or alter any other right, action, or remedy otherwise
available to a utility or cable television company.

502

Section 11. Section 76-6-412 is amended to read:

503

76-6-412. Theft - Classification of offenses - Action for treble damages.

i04

(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter [shall be] is punishable:

!05

(a) as a second degree felony [of the second degree] if the:
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506

(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000;

507

(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle;

>08

(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 7 6 - 1 - 6 0 1 , at the

i09

time of the theft; or

110

(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;

11

(b) as a third degree felony [of the third degree] if:

12

(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than

13

$5,000;

14

(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of any of the offenses listed in this

15

Subsection (l)(b)(ii), if each prior offense was committed within 10 years of the date of the

16

current conviction or the date of the offense upon which the current conviction is based:

17

£A} theft, any robbery, or any burglary with intent to commit theft; [or]

18

(B) any offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, Fraud; or

19

( Q any attempt to commit any offense under Subsection (l)(b)(ii)(A) or (B).

20

(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property taken is a stallion,

21

mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine,

22

poultry, or a fur-bearing animal raised for commercial purposes;

23
24

(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is o r exceeds [$300]
$500 but is less than [$1,000] $1,500: or

15
>6
YJ

(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less than [$360]
$500,
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or commits

58

theft of property described in Subsection 76-6-412(l)(b)(iii), is civilly liable for three times

\9

the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the plaintiff, and for costs of suit and

»0

reasonable [attorneys'] attorney fees.

1

Section 12, Section 76-6-505 is amended to read:

2

76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft - Presumption.

3

(1) (a) Any person w h o issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, for

S.B. 10
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534

the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money,

535

property, or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent,

536

knowing it will not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of

537

issuing a bad check or draft.

538

(b) For purposes of this Subsection (1), a person who issues a check or draft for which

539

payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or draft would not be paid if

540

he had no account with the drawee at the time of issue.

541

(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, for the

542

purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property,

543

or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of

544

which check or draft is legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft

545

if he fails to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused check or

546

draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or draft's nonpayment.

547

(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows:

548

(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within

549

a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is less than [$300] $500, the offense

550

is a class B misdemeanor.

551

(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period

552

not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is less than

553

[$1,000] $L500, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.

554

(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period

555

not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than

556

$5,000, the offense is a felony of the third degree.

557
558
559

(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period
not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $5,000, the offense is a second
• degree felony.

560

Section 13. Section 76-6-506.5 is amended to read:

561

76-6-506.5. Financial transaction card offenses - Classification - Multiple
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violations.
(1) Any person found guilty of unlawful conduct described in Section 76-6-506.2 or
76-6-506.6 is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is less than [$300] $500;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is less than [$1,000] $L500:
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
attempted to be obtained is or exceeds [$1,000] $L500 but is less than $5,000; and
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
attempted to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000.
(2) Multiple violations of Subsection 76-6-506.2(1), Section 76-6-506.6, and this

»74

section may be aggregated into a single offense, and the degree of the offense is determined by

•75

the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or attempted to be obtained through

•76

the multiple violations.

77
78

(3) The court shall make appropriate findings in any prosecution under this section
that the card holder did not commit the crime.

79

Section 14. Section 76-6-513 is amended to read:

80

76-6-513. Definitions — Unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary — Penalties.

81

(1) As used in this section:

82

(a) "Fiduciary" is as defined in Section 22-1-1.

83

(b) "Financial institution" means "depository institution" and "trust company" as

84

defined in Section 7-1-103.

85

(c) "Governmental entity" is as defined in Section 63G-7-102.

86

(d) "Person" does not include a financial institution whose fiduciary functions are

87

supervised by the Department of Financial Institutions or a federal regulatory agency.

88

(e) "Property" is as defined in Section 76-6-401.

89

(f) "Public monies" is as defined in Section 76-8-401.
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(2) A person is guilty of unlawfully dealing with property by a fiduciary if the person

591

deals with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property of a

592

governmental entity, public monies, or of a financial institution, in a manner which the person

593

knows is a violation of the person's duty and which involves substantial risk of loss or

594

detriment to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted. A

595

violation of this Subsection (2) is punishable under Section 76-6-412.

596

(3) (a) A person acting as a fiduciary is guilty of a violation of this subsection if,

597

without permission of the owner of the property or some other person with authority to give

598

permission, the person pledges as collateral for a personal loan, or as collateral for the benefit

599

of some party, other than the owner or the person for whose benefit the property was entrusted,

600

the property that has been entrusted to the fiduciary.

601

(b) An offense under Subsection (3)(a) is punishable as:

602

(i) a felony of the second degree if the value of the property wrongfully pledged is or

603
604
605
606

exceeds $5,000;
(ii) a felony of the third degree if the value of the property wrongfully pledged is or
exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than $5,000;
(iii) a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property is or exceeds [$300] $500, but

607

is less than [$1,000] $1,500 or the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, robbery,

608

burglary with intent to commit theft, or unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary; or

609

(iv) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property is less than [$300] $500.

610

Section 15. Section 76-6-518 is amended to read:

611

76-6-518. Criminal simulation.

612

(1) A person is guilty of criminal simulation if, with intent to defraud another:

613

(a) he makes or alters an object in whole or in part so that it appears to have value

614

because of age, antiquity, rarity, source, or authorship that it does not have;

515

(b) he sells, passes, or otherwise utters an object so made or altered;

516

(c) he possesses an object so made or altered with intent to sell, pass, or otherwise

517

utter it; or
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(d) h e authenticates or certifies an object so made or altered as genuine or as different
from what it is.

>20

(2) Criminal simulation is punishable as follows:

•21

(a) If the value defrauded or intended to b e defrauded is less than [$960] $500, the

>22
23
24
25
26
27
28

offense is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) If the value defrauded or intended to b e defrauded is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is
less than [$1,000] $ L 5 0 0 , the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
(c) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500
but is less than $5,000, the offense is a felony of the third degree.
(d) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded is or exceeds $5,000, the offense
is a felony of the second degree.

29

Section 16. Section 76-6-608 is amended to read:

30

76-6-608. Theft detection shielding devices prohibited — Penalties.

31

(1) A person may not knowingly:

32

(a) make or possess any container or device used for, intended for use for, or

53

represented as having the purpose of shielding merchandise from any electronic or magnetic

H

theft alarm sensor, with the intent to commit a theft of merchandise;

\5

(b) sell, offer to sell, advertise, give, transport, or otherwise transfer to another any

)6

container or device intended for use for or represented as having the purpose of shielding

\1

merchandise from any electronic or magnetic theft alarm sensor;

18

(c) possess any tool or instrument designed to remove any theft detection device from

S9

any merchandise, with the intent to use the tool or instrument to remove any theft detection

•0

device from any merchandise without the permission of the merchant or the person owning or

1

in possession of the merchandise; or

2
3

(d) intentionally remove a theft detection device from merchandise prior to purchase
and without the permission of the merchant.

4

(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c) is a class A misdemeanor.

5

(b) A violation of Subsection (l)(d) is a:

S.B. 10
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(i) class B misdemeanor if the value of the merchandise from which the theft detection
device is removed is less than [$300] $500; or

648
649

(ii) class A misdemeanor if the value of the merchandise from which the theft
detection device is removed is or exceeds [$300] $500.

650
651

(3) A violation of Subsection (1) is a separate offense from any offense listed in Title
76, Chapter 6, Part 4, Theft, or Part 6, Retail Theft.

652
653
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(4) Criminal prosecutions under this section do not affect any person's right of civil
action for redress for damages suffered as a result of any violation of this section.

654

Section 17. Section 76-6-703 is amended to read:

655

76-6-703. Computer crimes and penalties.

656

(1) A person who without authorization gains or attempts to gain access to and alters,

657

damages, destroys, discloses, or modifies any computer, computer network, computer

658

property, computer system, computer program, computer data or software, and thereby causes

659

damage to another, or obtains money, property, information, or a benefit for any person

660

without legal right, is guilty of:

661

(a) a class B misdemeanor when:

662

(i) the damage caused or the value of the money, property, or benefit obtained or

663

sought to be obtained is less than [$300] $500; or

664

(ii) the information obtained is not confidential;

665

(b) a class A misdemeanor when the damage caused or the value of the money,

666

property, or benefit obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is less

667

than [$i^eO] $1.500;

668

(c) a third degree felony when the damage caused or the value of the money, property,

669

or benefit obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than

670

$5,000;

671
672
673

(d) a second degree felony when the damage caused or the value of the money,
property, or benefit obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; or
(e) a third degree felony when:
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674

(i) the property or benefit obtained or sought to be obtained is a license or entitlement;

575

(ii) the damage is to the license or entitlement of another person; or

576

(iii) the information obtained is confidential; or

577

(iv) in gaining access the person breaches or breaks through a security system.

578

(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), a person who intentionally or

579

knowingly and without authorization gains or attempts to gain access to a computer, computer

580

network, computer property, or computer system under circumstances not otherwise

581

constituting an offense under this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

582

(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), a retailer that uses an electronic product

583

identification or tracking system, or other technology to identify, track, or price goods is not

584

guilty of a violation of Subsection (2)(a) if the equipment designed to read the electronic

)85

product identification or tracking system data and used by the retailer to identify, track, or

)86

price goods is located within the retailer's location.

)87

(3) A person w h o uses or knowingly allows another person to use any computer,

)88

computer network, computer property, or computer system, program, or software to devise or

>89

execute any artifice or scheme to defraud or to obtain money, property, services, or other

>90

things of value by false pretenses, promises, or representations, is guilty of an offense based on

>91

the value of the money, property, services, or things of value, in the degree set forth in

>92

Subsection 76-10-1801(1).

>93

(4) A person w h o intentionally or knowingly and without authorization, interferes with

•94

or interrupts computer services to another authorized to receive the services is guilty of a class

95

A misdemeanor.

96

(5) It is an affirmative defense to Subsections (1) and (2) that a person obtained access

97

or attempted to obtain access in response to, and for the purpose of protecting against or

98

investigating, a prior attempted or successful breach of security of a computer, computer

99

network, computer property, computer system whose security the person is authorized or

00

entitled to protect, and the access attempted or obtained was no greater than reasonably

01

necessary for that purpose.

S.B. 10
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702

Section 18. Section 76-6-1204 is amended to read:

703

76-6-1204, Classification of offense.

704

(1) Notwithstanding any other administrative, civil, or criminal penalties, a person

705

who violates Section 76-6-1203 is guilty of a:

706
707

(a) class A misdemeanor when the value is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is less than
[$1,000] $1,500;

708
709

(b) third degree felony when the value is or exceeds [$1,000] $L500 but is less than
$5,000;

710

(c) second degree felony when the value is or exceeds $5,000; and

711

(d) second degree felony when the object or purpose of the commission of an act of

712

mortgage fraud is the obtaining of sensitive personal identifying information, regardless of the

713

value.

714

(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) is measured

715

by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained by a

716

violation of Section 76-6-1203, except as provided in Subsection (l)(d).

717
718

(3) Each residential or commercial property transaction offense under this part
constitutes a separate violation.

719

Section 19. Section 76-8-1206 is amended to read:

720

76-8-1206. Penalties for public assistance fraud.

721

(1) The severity of the offense of public assistance fraud is classified in accordance

722

with the value of payments, assistance, or other benefits received, misappropriated, claimed, or

123

applied for as follows:

J24

(a) second degree felony if the value is or exceeds $5,000;

'25

(b) third degree felony if the value is or exceeds [$1,000] $L500 but is less than

'26
'27
'28
F

29

$5,000;
(c) class A misdemeanor if the value is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is less than
[$±#00] $1.500: and
(d) class B misdemeanor if the value is less than [$360] $500.
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(2) For purposes of Subsection (1), the value of an offense is calculated by aggregating

131

the values of each instance of public assistance fraud committed by the defendant as part of

132

the same facts and circumstances or a related series of facts and circumstances.

133

(3) Incidents of trafficking in food stamps that occur within a six-month period,

134

committed by an individual or coconspirators, are deemed to be a related series of facts and

135

circumstances regardless of whether the transactions are conducted with a variety of unrelated

^36

parties.

^37

Section 20. Section 76-8-1301 is amended to read:

^38

76-8-1301. False statements regarding unemployment compensation — Penalties.

^39

(1) (a) A person who makes a false statement or representation knowing it to be false

^40

or knowingly fails to disclose a material fact, to obtain or increase a benefit or other payment

HI

under Title 35A, Chapter 4, Employment Security Act, or under the Unemployment

'42

Compensation Law of any state or of the federal government for any person is guilty of

'43

unemployment insurance fraud.

'44

(b) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is:

'45

(i) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the money obtained or sought to be

'46
'47
'48
'49
'50
'51
r

52

r

53

obtained is less than [$300] $500;
(ii) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the money obtained or sought to be
obtained is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is less than [$1,000] $1,500;
(iii) a third degree felony when the value of the money obtained or sought to be
obtained is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than $5,000; or
(iv) a second degree felony when the value of the money obtained or sought to be
obtained is or exceeds $5,000.
(c) The determination of the degree of an offense under Subsection (l)(b) shall be

54

measured by the total value of all money obtained or sought to be obtained by the unlawful

55

conduct.

56
57

(2) (a) An officer or agent of an employing unit as defined in Section 35 A-4-202 or
any other person who makes a false statement or representation knowing it to be false, or who

S.B. 10
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758

knowingly fails to disclose a material fact, to prevent or reduce the payment of unemployment

759

compensation benefits to an individual entitled to those benefits, or to avoid becoming or

760

remaining a subject employer or to avoid or reduce any contribution or other payment required

761

from an employing unit under Title 35 A, Chapter 4, Employment Security Act, or under the

762

Unemployment Compensation Law of any state or of the federal government, or who willfully

763

fails or refuses to make a contribution or other payment or to furnish any report required in

764

Title 35A, Chapter 4, Employment Security Act, or to produce or permit the inspection or

765

copying of records as required under that chapter is guilty of unemployment insurance fraud.

766

(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is:

767

(i) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the money obtained or sought to be

768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775

obtained is less than [$366] $500;
(ii) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the money obtained or sought to be
obtained is or exceeds [$306] $500 but is less than [$1,000] $1,500;
(iii) a third degree felony when the value of the money obtained or sought to be
obtained is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than $5,000; or
(iv) a second degree felony when the value of the money obtained or sought to be
obtained is or exceeds $5,000.
(3) (a) A person who willfully violates any provision of Title 35 A, Chapter 4,

776

Employment Security Act, or any order made under that chapter, the violation of which is

111

made unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of that chapter, and for

7

78

which a penalty is neither prescribed in that chapter nor provided by any other applicable

79

statute is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

r

80

(b) Each day a violation of Subsection (3)(a) continues shall be a separate offense.

'81

(4) A person is guilty of a class C misdemeanor if:

82

(a) as an employee of the Department of Workforce Services, in willful violation of

83

Section 35A-4-312, the employee makes a disclosure of information obtained from an

84

employing unit or individual in the administration of Title 35 A, Chapter 4, Employment

85

Security Act; or
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(b) the person has obtained a list of applicants for work or of claimants or recipients of

787

benefits under Title 35A, Chapter 4, Employment Security Act, and uses or permits the use of

788

the list for any political purpose.

789

Section 21. Section 76-10-1801 is amended to read:

790

76-10-1801. Communications fraud « Elements - Penalties.

^91

(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain

r

92

f

from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,

93

representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly

r

94

with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or

r

artifice is guilty of:

95

96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06

(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is less than r$300] $500:
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is less than [$1,000] $1,500:
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than $5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and
(e) a second degree felony when the object or purpose of the scheme or artifice to
defraud is the obtaining of sensitive personal identifying information, regardless of the value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be

07

measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained

08

by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as provided in Subsection (l)(e).

09

(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense

10
11

described in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1)

12

to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary

13

element of the offense.
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(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a

815

scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of communication

816

fraud.

817

(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to:

818

(i) bestow, convey, make known, recount, or impart;

819

(ii) give by way of information;

820

(iii) talk over; or

821

(iv) transmit information.

822

(b) Means of communication include use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio,

823
824

television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses,

825

representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted

826

intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.

827
828

(8) As used in this section, "sensitive personal identifying information" means
information regarding an individual's:

829

(a) Social Security number;

830

(b) driver's license number or other government issued identification number;

831

(c) financial account number or credit or debit card number;

832

(d) password or personal identification number or other identification required to gain

833

access to a financial account or a secure website;

834

(e) automated or electronic signature;

335

(f) unique biometric data; or

336

(g) any other information that can be used to gain access to an individual's financial

337

accounts or to obtain goods or services.

$38

Section 22. Section 78A-6-703 is amended to read:

539

78A-6-703. Certification hearings - Juvenile court to hold preliminary hearing

?40
541

— Factors considered by juvenile court for waiver of jurisdiction to district court.
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78A-6-602(3) alleges
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the commission of an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the

(43

juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing.

!44
!45
146
147
148

49
50
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(2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going forward with its
case and the burden of establishing:
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the defendant
committed it; and
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best interests

of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction.
(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests of the minor

51

or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the juvenile court shall consider,

52

and may base its decision on, the finding of one or more of the following factors:

53
54
55

(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community
requires isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities;
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor under circumstances

56

which would subject the minor to enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203.1 if the minor

57

were adult and the offense was committed:

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
56
57
58
59

{i} in concert with two or more persons [under circumstances which would subject the
minor to enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult];
(ii) for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street
gang as defined in Section 76-9-802; or
(iii) to gain recognition, acceptance, membership, or increased status with a criminal
street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802:
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated,
or willful manner;
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater weight being
given to offenses against persons, except as provided in Section 76-8-418;
(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of [his] the minor's
home, environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living;
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870

(f) the record and previous history of the minor;

871

(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities available to the

872
873

juvenile court;
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the

874

minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in the

875

district court;

876

(i) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; and

877

(j) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school premises as

878
879
880
881
882

provided in Section 76-10-505.5.
(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in Subsection (3) is
discretionary with the court.
(5) (a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental, physical,
educational, and social history may be considered by the court.

883

(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other interested party,

884

the court shall require the person or agency preparing the report and other material to appear

885

and be subject to both direct and cross-examination.

886

(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath, call

887

witnesses, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the factors required by

888

Subsection (3).

889
890

(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the court may
enter an order:

891

(a) certifying that finding; and

892

(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district court.

893

(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination held by

894

the juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but the juvenile court shall

395

proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional consideration referred to in

396

Subsection (2)(b).

191

(9) The provisions of Section 78A-6-115, Section 78A-6-1 111, and other provisions
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198

relating to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the hearing held under this section to

199

the extent they are pertinent.

>00
K)l

(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in the district
court is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court.

>02

(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have the same

>03

right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile

>04

court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20,

>05

Bail.

>06

(12) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section or when a

>07

criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before a

K)8

committing magistrate charging the minor with an offense described in Section 78A-6-702,

K)9

the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the jurisdiction of the juvenile

40

court over the minor is terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the

41

same criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against [htm]

42

the minor, except as provided in Subsection (14).

43

(13) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of any of the charges filed or on any

44

other offense arising out of the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction

45

over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing.

46

(14) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice

47

Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there

48

is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court.

49

Section 23. Section 78B-6-1101 is amended to read:

>20

7 8 B - 6 - 1 1 0 1 . Definitions — Nuisance — Right of action.

>21

(1) A nuisance is anything which is injurious to health, indecent, offensive to the

'22

senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable

>23

enjoyment of life or property. A nuisance may be the subject of an action.

>24

(2) A nuisance may include the following:

>25

(a) drug houses and drug dealing as provided in Section 78B-6-1107;
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926

(b) gambling as provided in Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 11;

927

(c) criminal activity committed in concert with two or more persons as provided in

928

Section 76-3-203.1;

929
930

(d) criminal activity committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
with any criminal street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802;

931
932

(e) criminal activity committed to gain recognition, acceptance, membership, or
increased status with a criminal street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802:

933
934

[(d)] (jQ party houses which frequently create conditions defined in Subsection (1);
and

935

[fc)] (g) prostitution as provided in Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13.

936

(3) A nuisance under this part includes tobacco smoke that drifts into any residential

937

unit a person rents, leases, or owns, from another residential or commercial unit and the

938

smoke:

939

(a) drifts in more than once in each of two or more consecutive seven-day periods; and

940

(b) creates any of the conditions under Subsection (1).

?41

(4) Subsection (3) does not apply to:

942

(a) residential rental units available for temporary rental, such as for vacations, or

?43

available for only 30 or fewer days at a time; or

)44

(b) hotel or motel rooms.

)45

(5) Subsection (3) does not apply to any unit that is part of a timeshare development,

)46

as defined in Section 57-19-2, or subject to a timeshare interest as defined in Section 57-19-2.

>47

(6) An action may be brought by any person whose property is injuriously affected, or

48
49

whose personal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance.
(7) "Agricultural operation" means any activity engaged in the commercial production

50

of crops, orchards, aquaculture, livestock, poultry, livestock products, poultry products, and

51

the facilities, equipment, and property used to facilitate the activity.

52
53

(8) "Manufacturing facility" means any factory, plant, or other facility including its
appurtenances, where the form of raw materials, processed materials, commodities, or other
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54

physical objects is converted or otherwise changed into other materials, commodities, or

55

physical objects or where such materials, commodities, or physical objects are combined to

56

form a new material, commodity, or physical object.

57

Section 24. Section 78B-6-1107 is amended to read:

58

78B-6-1107. Nuisance - Right of action to abate nuisances - Drug houses and

59

drug dealing - Gambling -- Criminal activity - Prostitution - Weapons.

60

(1) Every building or place is a nuisance where:

61

(a) the unlawful sale, manufacture, service, storage, distribution, dispensing, or

62

acquisition occurs of any controlled substance, precursor, or analog specified in Title 58,

63

Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act;

64

(b) gambling is permitted to be played, conducted, or dealt upon as prohibited in Title

'65

76, Chapter 10, Part 11, Gambling, which creates the conditions of a nuisance as defined in

'66

Subsection 78B-6-1101(1);

67
'68
69
70
'71
72
73
74
75
76

(c) criminal activity is committed in concert with two or more persons as provided in
Section 76-3-203.1;
(d) criminal activity is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with any criminal street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802;
(e) criminal activity is committed to gain recognition, acceptance, membership, or
increased status with a criminal street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802;
[(d)] (f! parties occur frequently which create the conditions of a nuisance as defined
in Subsection 78B-6-1101(1);
[(c)] {g} prostitution or promotion of prostitution is regularly carried on by one or
more persons as provided in Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13, Prostitution; and

77

[ff)] (h} a violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5, Weapons, occurs on the premises.

78

(2) It is a defense to nuisance under Subsection (l)(a) if the defendant can prove that

79
80
81

the defendant is lawfully entitled to possession of a controlled substance.
(3) Sections 78B-6-1108 through 78B-6-1114 govern only an abatement by eviction
of the nuisance as defined in Subsection (1).
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Section 25. Effective date.

983

This bill takes effect on November 1. 2010.
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